Introduction

Someone once said that if philosophers used consistently the same meaning for a given word, most philosophical debates would be instantly resolved. It is worth considering whether the same can be true of political issues, where words like “rights”, “freedom”, and “justice” often carry very different (even opposite) meanings for different people. One that I have come across is the term “representative democracy”. To me, the term “representative” means that we, as individuals, do not have the time or energy to discuss and vote on every single issue that comes up, and so we delegate representatives who sit in the parliament and do that job for us.

To some of my friends, as I found out, the term “representative” implies more. It means ensuring that the various social groups (such as women and ethnic minorities) are represented in the parliament, and the way to ensure this is (at least for now) through mandated quotas. Armenia is no exception to this widespread practice – ethnic minorities (Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, and Russians), as well as women, have quotas to ensure their representation in the parliament. There is one mandate for each ethnic minority (Part 9 of Article 95 of the electoral code [1]), as well as a gender equality standard (Part 3 of Article 143 [1]) that sets a quantitative minimum to the number of representatives of each sex. While the latter is sex-neutral, amendments have been made to ensure a certain proportion of women in the parliament [2], [3].

Ensuring political representation is not the only argument that has been advanced for these policies. Gender quotas in particular are often accompanied by suggestions that this would encourage women and girls to pursue political careers. While using elected women as mascots (which they are, in my view, in so far as they are pushed through by legislative force in order to be “role models” [4] for the rest of the population) is hardly desirable, my goal here is to focus on the argument for political representation. Is it the case that ensuring a certain proportion of a social group in parliament means a better political representation?

The big problem

The first and the biggest problem is that women in parliament are not voted for by women. I don’t mean that women do not vote; it’s just that men vote as well. And they all vote for the same pool of candidates or parties. In other words, a woman supposedly representing other women in parliament owes as much to men’s votes as to women’s. As far as I can see, the claim of political representation is already on very shaky grounds. If I am a member of group X, and I am ensured a quota so that group X can be represented in the parliament, shouldn’t it be that group X, and no one else, decides whether I represent its interests?

And women here are not nearly in as bad a shape as ethnic minorities are; after all, women comprise roughly half of the population, so they still have a considerable (though by no means exclusive) say in what kind of women will be in the parliament. The minorities (especially in Armenia, because their numbers are very small) have nearly no weight at all! The way minority mandates are distributed in the Armenian parliament is through the overall weight of each party (I describe it in more detail in footnote [5]), not through what the actual minorities voted on. In other words, even if all four minorities had voted for the opposition, three out of four minority mandates would have gone to the party in power, based on the last election results. Moreover, theoretically, even if the Kurdish minority votes for the party in power, they may not necessarily prefer the individual Kurdish member of that party, but that is not taken into consideration either. So much for ensuring political representation [6].

The proper way to ensure political representation of separate groups is to have separate voting. Women would have to vote separately on who they want to be represented by, and minorities would have to hold a separate vote each, to elect their respective representatives. That way, the candidate in questions is responsible solely to the group whose representation she is supposed to ensure, justifying the quota. Is separating voting in this manner a good path to follow? I certainly suspect not, but this is what you would have to do to ensure proper political representation of various social groups, which is what the quotas aim to achieve.

Statistical representation?

Even if the argument for proper political representation has failed the basic prerequisite, we can still try pursuing other paths of argumentation. What if, by ensuring a certain number of women, we get a statistically representative sample? After all, even if men have as much say as women do in choosing the supposed female representatives, once we get enough of them in the parliament, this could be a nice, statistically representative sample; isn’t that how polling is done? Unfortunately, the average sample size for proper polling of the general population is on the order of five hundred to a thousand or so [7]. Ensuring that there are 500 women in a parliament makes for a pretty big one, certainly bigger than Armenia’s 100-seat national assembly. And I haven’t even talked about ethnic minorities yet. But there would be a much more serious problem with statistical representation – a sample is valid only if selected randomly. That’s the opposite of how politicians are elected (as much as we sometimes feel that they are). Politicians tend to come from a certain socioeconomic background, certain temperament, experience; they are most likely not an average person, and definitely not a randomly (s)elected one. Unless we are willing to have 1000-person parliaments with randomly selected members in it, statistical representation doesn’t work.

One last try

There may still be one last straw to grasp at. Even if women in parliament get half their votes from men, even if they cannot be statistically representative, could it be that, by virtue of being a woman, they can act as proper representatives for women in general? And can’t a Kurd in parliament be considered a representative for the Kurdish minority by virtue of being one? But the underlying assumption behind this notion is erroneous, and has been shared by racists, sexists, and nazis throughout history. It’s the assumption that groups are more different from each other than they are within themselves. In other words, the assumption is that there is more diversity between groups than within groups. Once you’ve seen a Black man, you know what they all are like, at least in so far as they are different from Whites. Once you’ve dated a woman, you know what women are like, at least in so far as they are different from men. But the truth is the opposite – there is much more overlap between groups, and much more diversity within them. On personality traits, political preferences, and social views, there are plenty of women and men on both sides. Individuals belonging to ethnic minorities are diverse as well, and the distinct characteristics of these groups can change culturally and socially over time, becoming more or less assimilated to the general society in which they live.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I haven’t yet found a good principle justifying the use of parliamentary quotas, in so far as an argument for political representation is concerned. Some considerations remain to be raised. Why do representatives of women as a group have to be female? If there is a man that women feel represents their interests well, can’t he be considered? Can’t an Armenian represent Yazidi communities, or an Assyrian represent Kurdish ones? Once again, the underlying assumption seems to be that groups are so different in their experience and views that no member of one group can be a legitimate representative of another. I don’t know if many people actually believe that, but it seems implicit in the decision-making behind these quotas, showing at least an inconsistency in the principles being used. Representative democracy is meant to represent individuals, not this or that pre-defined group. The problem is compounded by the fact that you can divide groups in any way you like, leading to potentially endless ways to cut and shape parliamentary representation, while leaving less and less room for actual voting power of the citizens (wouldn’t postmodernists say that it is precisely the ones in power who choose how groups are defined?). Psychologist Jordan Peterson has commented on how the recognition that society can be divided in a nearly infinite number of ways, and that the ultimate minority is the individual, is a pathway that the West already undertook in the past. Human beings are prone to divide others into groups (as opposed to viewing each other primarily as individuals), and many a conflict has arisen from viewing history and the present primarily in that manner. It may well be a natural instinct of humanity, but we could at least avoid having the political institutions explicitly cater to that instinct.

Endnotes and references

[1] Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia, accessed in English

[2] UN Women – “Armenia has adopted a new Constitution in December 2015, and the new Electoral Code entered into force on 1 June 2016. It increases the quota for women’s representation to 25 per cent of women in elective bodies this year from 20 per cent and aims to gradually increase it to 30 per cent by 2021.”

[3] International IDEA database – “The gender quota plans to be changed in 2021 to guarantee that, at least, 1 in 3 (33%) are women”

[4] Many women can and have, of course, been role models for younger girls who wished to pursue careers in otherwise male-dominated environments. The argument is not that there are no obstacles for women in male-dominated environments, nor that being a role model is a necessarily bad thing. It is when the supposed “role model” has been pushed through the supposed barriers (far lesser than what the first suffragettes had to face) by using legislative force, that what is considered “role modelling” becomes an ideological mascoting. Role models are role models precisely due to their individual achievements, as opposed to mascots, whose job is to be on the stage for excitement. Daniel Ioannisyan commented that the quota for the participation of women in the parliament should be such that the society could see women’s engagement in politics, and realize that this is normal (surely he meant to say “so that society could see that women cannot make it into politics on their own efforts, and need a legislative force to propel them upwards”?). His follow-up statement, “but I do not think that this number should be very high, it will be too artificial,” is a dead giveaway, especially the word “too”.

[5] Section 9 of Article 95 of the electoral code gives the formula for distributing the four minority mandates. In each round, a coefficient is calculated for each party, and the political party with the highest coefficient gets a mandate. Once a party gets an ethnic mandate, its coefficient becomes lower for the next round. An example using the latest elections will illustrate this principle clearer: “Civil Contract” won 79 seats, “Armenia Alliance” won 29, and “I Have Honor Alliance” won 7. So the coefficients are 79, 29, and 7. Round 1: “Civil Contract” has the highest coefficient, and therefore gets an ethnic minority mandate. Round 2: For the second round, “Civil Contract” coefficient is 79/2=40; it’s divided by 2 because they already got one mandate. Other parties’ coefficients remain the same. “Civil Contract” still has the highest coefficient, so they receive another ethnic minority mandate. Round 3: Now “Civil Contract” coefficient is 79/3=26. This time, “Armenia Alliance” has the highest coefficient of 29, so they receive this mandate. Round 4: Now “Armenia Alliance” has a coefficient of 29/2=15, which means that “Civil Contract” is once again at the top with a coefficient of 26, receiving the fourth and the final mandate. Notice how this procedure is completely independent of which party the minorities actually voted for. If the coefficients are equal at some point, the mandates are distributed by drawing of lots, which only adds salt to injury.

[6] Russian minorities’ representative Sandykov expressed concern over the Assyrian mandate going to the opposition in the last election. His reasons and solution are telling:

“Based on my work experience, I believe that regardless of who is in power, ethnic minorities should maintain their political neutrality, and they should not be supporters of any party. If it is technically impossible, then it is desirable that they enter parliament according to the quotas of the ruling force since this gives more opportunities to resolve their issues with the ruling team and excludes the political component that interferes with the solution of problems“.

The idea that Sandykov, however experienced, can propose a political mechanism by which ethnic minorities maintain their political neutrality and do not support any party (as opposed to ethnic minorities simply voting on which party they prefer, since they are actually Armenian citizens) is somewhat disturbing. His solution is that since political neutrality may not be feasible, minorities should be coupled with the ruling force so as to advance their interests easier. One’s mind boggles at the number of ways in which these statements are politically problematic; but then again, Sandykov got in because his party, “Civil Contract”, got the majority of the overall votes, not because the Russian minority actually entrusted him with their votes. When Sandykov says “it is desirable that they enter parliament according to the quotas”, surely he misspoke “that I and other minority representatives enter parliament according to the quotas”. Ethnic minority citizens had already entered the parliament as any other citizens had, by voting for a party. No separate election for special minority representatives was held.

[7] American Association for Public Opinion Research